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Abstract 
 
In 1992 the Cadbury Committee report on the financial aspects of corporate governance was 
published.  The Committee had been established following the failures of a number of high 
profile businesses in the UK which had shaken confidence in the market.  Some nine years 
later, in 2001, the collapse of Enron sent shockwaves through the US market. As a result of the 
Enron collapse and various other high profile scandals in the years since its occurrence, the US 
is examining its own corporate governance structures and provisions to determine how these 
might be improved and help avoid another Enron.  The EU similarly is developing principles 
and legislation to improve corporate governance, and scandals such as Royal Ahold and 
Parmalat have helped drive further governance reforms. 
 
In this paper we detail the development of corporate governance codes in the UK and the 
adaptation of similar codes in the EU. We discuss the role of the financial sector in corporate 
governance and how principles for regulation and supervision of the financial sector 
complement codes of conduct and legislation in the area of corporate governance. 
JEL Classification numbers: G34, G28, G22, G23 
Keywords: corporate governance, financial sector; institutional investors. 
 
The Financial Sector and Corporate Governance – Lessons from the UK 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Cadbury Report issued in the UK in 1992 laid the foundations of a set of corporate 
governance codes, not just in the UK but in countries as diverse as Russia and India, which 
have incorporated its main principles into their own corporate governance codes.  Following 
on from the collapse of Enron in 2001, and subsequent high profile corporate scandals, 
corporate governance has gained a much higher profile and it is useful to examine the 
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development and evolution of corporate governance in the UK to see what lessons might be 
learnt. 
 
At the outset it is helpful to set the context by briefly reviewing some of the definitions of 
corporate governance: 
 
Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992) defined corporate governance as ‘the whole system of controls, 
both financial and otherwise, by which a company is directed and controlled’. 
 
The OECD (1999) defined it as ‘a set of relationships between a company’s board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  It also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives, and 
monitoring performance are determined’. 
 
These definitions illustrate well what corporate governance is and it can be seen that it is 
concerned with both the internal aspects of the company, such as internal controls and board 
structure, and external aspects such as the relationship with shareholders and stakeholders.  
Importantly it also provides the mechanism through which corporate objectives may be set, 
monitored and achieved.   
 
The academic study of corporate governance goes beyond the above definition and includes 
mechanism for changes in ownership and management, and the incentives in capital markets 
for such changes and for managerial conduct. These incentives are based on the need for 
external funding from banks and public debt and equity markets. The availability of external 
sources of funding as a key factor for corporate governance was clearly appreciated by 
Arthur Levitt when he stated ‘If a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate 
governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere.  If investors are not confident with the 
level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere.  If a country opts for lax accounting and 
reporting standards, capital will flow elsewhere.  All enterprises in that country – regardless 
of how steadfast a particular company’s practices may be – suffer the consequences’.   
 
The above quote does not consider the difficulty of evaluating and comparing different 
corporate governance systems. These systems are not alike in two countries. Rules and 
practices in each country have developed over time in a specific legal and political 
environment. Each system can be thought of as a complex web, wherein the role of certain 
rules depends on the rest of the system. Thus, when drawing lessons from one country’s 
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experience for another country it is important to consider that there may be many different 
ways to achieve certain objectives, and that the same rule may have different consequences in 
different systems. Thus, simply transplanting one element from one country to another may 
not always lead to the intended consequences. This does not mean that one country cannot 
learn from another but that mechanisms to achieve certain objectives may have to be 
designed differently in different corporate governance systems. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we discuss the development of corporate 
governance in the UK: we consider the environment and framework within which corporate 
governance has developed; we discuss the main corporate governance provisions in the UK, 
and we detail the role of institutional investors in UK corporate governance. The role of the 
financial sector in corporate governance and principles for regulation and information 
disclosure to achieve effective corporate governance are discussed. We emphasize the role of 
“market conform” regulation and legislation and the important role of competition in markets 
as well as among institutional structures. Thereafter we turn to the adaptation of UK 
corporate governance principles focusing on the US and the EU. Recent US legislation and a 
report on corporate governance reform in the EU from a “High level Group of Experts on 
Company Law” will be discussed in light of the principles for market conformity of 
regulation.  
 
2. Recent Developments in Corporate Governance in the UK 
There have been a number of key drivers to increased attention to corporate governance in the 
UK: 
 
•  Firstly, collapses of prominent business, both in the financial and  
non-financial sectors, such as Polly Peck, BCCI, and later Barings; led to increased 
emphasis on controls to safeguard assets 
 
•  Secondly, the changing pattern of share ownership, particularly in the US and UK, which 
led to a greater concentration of share ownership in the hands of institutional investors, 
such as pension funds and insurance companies.  In the UK, for example, institutional 
investors own around 80% of the UK stock market (see below for further detail).  In the 
US, the figure is less, but institutional investors are very powerful in absolute terms. 
 
• Thirdly, institutional investors are increasingly seeking to diversify their portfolios and 
invest overseas.  They then look for reassurances that their investment will be protected. 
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• Fourthly, with technological advances in communications and markets generally, ideas 
can be disseminated more widely and more quickly, and institutional investors globally 
are talking to each other more and forming common views on key aspects of investment 
such as corporate governance. 
 
• Fifthly, given that businesses as diverse as family owned firms and state owned 
enterprises are increasingly seeking external funds, whether that is from domestic sources 
or international sources, corporate governance takes on an increasingly important role in 
helping to provide confidence in those companies and hence help to obtain external 
funding at the lowest cost possible. 
 
•    Finally, within a country (as opposed to a company or individual         business), good 
corporate governance helps to engender confidence in the stock market and hence in the 
economic environment as a whole, creating a more attractive environment for 
investment. 
 
Mallin (1994) identified a framework within which corporate governance was 
developing in the UK.  She described this as a triangle of corporate governance 
influences with the apexes being the institutional investors and their representative 
bodies, the Cadbury Committee recommendations and the London Stock Exchange as 
the regulatory element.  An update of this triangularisation would include the Combined 
Code 1998 revised 2003 (in addition to the original Cadbury Code); whilst institutional 
investors and their representative bodies could also include the reports of Myners (2001) 
and the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (2003). 
 
3. Main Corporate Governance Provisions in the UK 
The Cadbury Report (Report of the UK Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, former Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes and a 
director of the Bank of England) was published in 1992 (Cadbury, 1992).  Its 
recommendations were as follows: 
• Companies should establish two key board committees: audit – composed of non-
executive directors (NEDs), responsible to the board; remuneration - responsible to the 
board for recommending remuneration of directors.  In addition, a nomination committee 
is suggested as a way to help ensure a formal and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors to the board. 
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• There should be at least 3 independent NEDs and board balance meaning a balance of 
executives relative to NEDs so that no individual  can dominate the board’s decision 
making. 
• Separation of roles of Chair (running of the board) and CEO (executive  responsible for 
running the business). 
 
A key element of corporate governance is the appointment of independent non-executive 
directors by an appropriate process (the nomination committee being one suggested 
mechanism).  The definition of independence could take up many pages of discussion but in a 
nutshell, the Cadbury Report states that non-executives [being] independent of the company, 
means ‘that apart from their directors’ fees and shareholdings, they should be independent of 
management and free from any business or other relationship which could materially interfere 
with the exercise of their independent judgment’. 
 
The Greenbury Report (1995) focused on executive remuneration whilst the Hampel 
Committee (1998) reviewed the corporate governance recommendations in force in the UK at 
that time.  The recommendations of the Turnbull Report (1999) were concerned with the 
management of internal controls and risk. 
 
The Combined Code (1998) was revised in 2003 to take account of various corporate 
governance developments in the UK and globally.  It has two main parts: one on companies 
and one on institutional shareholders.  The part on companies contains sections on directors, 
remuneration, accountability and audit, and relations with shareholders.  In relation to 
directors, the Combined Code states that there should be an effective board, which is 
collectively responsible for the success of the company and a clear division of responsibilities 
at the head of the company (separation of the roles of Chair and CEO).   
 
The inclusion of a balance of executive and non-executive directors (and in particular 
independent non-executive directors) on the board will help prevent an individual becoming 
too dominant, and a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board should help ensure that the most appropriate people are appointed as 
directors.  Information should be provided to the board in a timely manner to enable it to make 
informed decisions, and all directors should regularly update their skills and knowledge.  A 
formal and rigorous evaluation should be carried out annually of the board’s performance and 
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that of the committees and individual directors.  Finally all directors should be put forward at 
regular intervals for re-election (as long as their performance remains satisfactory). 
 
In relation to remuneration, the Combined Code states that ‘levels of remuneration should be 
sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company 
successfully’.  Regarding accountability and audit, the board should give a balanced and 
comprehensible assessment of the company’s position, and should maintain a sound system of 
internal controls.  The board should establish an audit committee of independent non-executive 
directors. 
 
Appertaining to relations with shareholders, there should be ‘a dialogue based on the mutual 
understanding of objectives’.  Whilst there should be ongoing dialogue between the 
companies’ directors and its major shareholders, the annual general meeting is seen a means of 
communicating with investors generally and encouraging their involvement. 
 
The Combined Code (2003) recommends that institutional investors should have a dialogue 
with companies based, as previously mentioned, on the ‘mutual understanding of objectives’.  
Institutional investors are encouraged to take all factors into account when assessing a 
company’s corporate governance (for example, smaller companies often have fewer 
independent non-executive directors).  As with earlier UK corporate governance codes, 
institutional investors are exhorted to make considered use of their votes. 
 
Of course as well as the corporate governance developments and the drivers that have led to 
these, it is essential to consider the framework within which these have developed.  An 
essential part of this framework is the role of institutional investors in the stock market and, as 
a result, their potential influence. 
 
4. The Role of Institutional Investors in the UK 
 
The Cadbury Committee (1992) viewed institutional investors as having a special 
responsibility to try to ensure that its recommendations were adopted by companies, stating 
that ‘institutional shareholders in particular ... should use their influence as owners to ensure 
that the companies in which they have invested comply with the Code’ (p. 54).  Similarly, in 
the 
 report of the Hampel Committee (1998), it is stated that ‘it is clear ... that a discussion of the 
role of shareholders in corporate governance will mainly concern the institutions’ (p. 40).  
Therefore, the most influential committees’ reports (now embodied in the Combined Code) 
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that have reported on corporate governance in the UK clearly emphasise the role of 
institutional investors. It is very clear from the aforementioned reports that the potential of 
institutional investors to exert significant influence on companies has clear implications for 
corporate governance, especially in terms of the standards of corporate governance adopted 
and the extent to which issues are enforced.  On the other hand, it is necessary to consider that 
many institutional investors are portfolio investors with financial expertise as opposed to 
industrial expertise. The latter is required to develop and evaluate corporate strategic decisions, 
while financial expertise is best suited for analysing financial data released by firms and 
government agencies. Nevertheless, there is clearly an important role   for institutional 
investors in corporate governance. This role is discussed next. 
 
The shareholder composition varies tremendously across the world.  In the UK and the US 
institutional investors have become very important over the last thirty years as their share 
ownership has increased and they have become more active in their ownership role.  
Institutional investors tend to have a fiduciary responsibility, this is the responsibility to act in 
the best interests of a third party (generally the beneficial, or ultimate owners of the shares).  
Until recently this responsibility has tended to concentrate on ensuring that they invest in 
companies that are not only profitable but which will continue to have a growing trend of 
profits.  Whilst this remains the case, governments and pressure groups have raised the 
question of how these profits are achieved.  We now see institutional investors being much 
more concerned about the internal governance of the company and also about the company’s 
relationship with other stakeholder groups including society as a whole.  
 
The latest statistics produced by the ONS (2003) on UK Share Ownership as at 31st December 
2002 highlight that institutional investors own around 80% of UK equity, with the largest 
holdings being those of insurance companies 20%, pension funds 16%, and overseas investors 
32%.  Clearly institutional investors have the ability to exercise significant influence in UK 
corporate governance developments. 
 
In his seminal work, Hirschman (1970) identified the exercise of institutional power within an 
‘exit and voice’ framework; he argued that dissatisfaction could be expressed directly to 
management, (the voice option), or by selling the shareholding, (the exit option).  The latter 
choice is constrained by the size of institutional investors’ holdings and their policy of 
maintaining diversified balanced portfolios.  Myners (1995) emphasized the role that 
institutional investors should play in an investee company and outlined the way that a ‘model’ 
company and a ‘model’ institutional investor might relate to each other.  The meetings 
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between institutional investors and companies were seen as an extremely important means of 
communication between the two parties and this was emphasized by Mallin (1994) in her 
paper on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, where she highlighted the 
role of one-to-one meetings between institutional investors and their investee companies.  
Mallin (1997) analysed the institutional investor ownership of financial institutions in the UK 
and also the adoption of key corporate governance structures in financial institutions and found 
that the life assurance companies had the highest level of adoption of key board committees 
(audit, remuneration, nomination committees) whilst the retail bank sector had the highest 
proportion of non-executive directors. 
 
The Myners Report (2001) recommended that fund managers should be more active, so that, 
for example, reservations about strategy, people or other potential causes of underperformance 
(or loss of value) should form the basis for greater intervention.  
 
Recently there have been pronouncements by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and 
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF); and the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee 
(ISC) about institutional investors and their role in corporate governance.  The ISC (2002) 
issued a statement on the responsibilities of institutional shareholders and stated that the 
policies on activism that they describe ‘do not constitute an obligation to micro-manage the 
affairs of investee companies, but rather relate to procedures designed to ensure that 
shareholders derive value from their investments by dealing effectively with concerns over 
under-performance.  Nor do they preclude a decision to sell a holding, where this is the most 
effective response to such concerns’.  In other words, the exercise of ‘voice’ is recommended 
but ‘exit’ is not precluded. 
 
The ISC recommends that institutional shareholders should have a clear statement of their 
policy on activism and on how they will discharge their responsibilities; monitor performance; 
intervene when necessary; and evaluate and report on the outcomes of their shareholder 
activism. 
 
The increased pressure on institutional investors to become actively involved in corporate 
governance blurs the distinction between these investors and “strategic investors” which 
traditionally play a major role in continental corporate governance systems. We return to this 
issue below. 
 
5. The Role of Auditors 
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Echoing the debate in the US, the UK Treasury has also commissioned a report on conflicts of 
interest between auditing and consulting within accounting firms and the reporting committee 
is also considering the merits of revolving auditors.  These areas have caused considerable 
debate amongst the various interested groups including companies, investors and the auditors 
themselves. Issues of auditing and conflicts of interest have become major concerns on the 
Continent as well. We return to these issues in the next section wherein we discuss the role of 
financial markets and institutions in corporate governance. 
 
 
6. The Financial Sector and Corporate Governance 
 
It is clear that the financial sector has a major role to play in corporate governance.  Banks in 
‘Continental’ Europe (CE), as lenders to SMEs and ‘Mittelstand’ companies have traditionally 
played a major role in corporate governance through equity-holdings, cross-shareholdings and 
reciprocal board membership.  In contrast, UK banks have not been major shareholders. 
Instead, pension insurance and mutual funds’ are more highly developed reflecting the more 
important role hitherto played by the capital market in the UK. Shareholder activism has 
however, only recently begun to emerge as a significant force in the UK.  As noted above, this 
is being encouraged by the Institutional Shareholders Committee and the UK government is 
considering making voting by fund managers at shareholders meetings compulsory. Thereby, 
institutional shareholders in the UK take on some of the roles “strategic investors” have in CE. 
Hitherto, the threat of hostile takeover through mergers and acquisitions has been seen as the 
main conditioning force in the UK.  The CE approach has been to manage restructuring 
through friendly negotiations among strategic investors with controlling ownership-stakes in 
the firms while avoiding contested ‘mergers’ and costly bankruptcies. Control cannot be 
threatened directly in the market place because of the existence of take-over defenses in the 
form of, for example, differentiated voting-rights for different classed of shares. These 
strategic investors can be thought of as “insiders” in the corporations while institutional 
investors traditionally have been “outsiders”. The corporate governance codes in the UK can 
be thought of as instruments of making “outsiders” taking on the role of “insiders” in CE. 
 
Until recently it seemed that there was a process of convergence underway (Mullineux, 2003).  
The US (and Japan) would allow European style universal banking (combining commercial 
and investment banking) and bancassurance (combining banking and insurance) whilst capital 
markets would increase in importance in CE driven by privatization of industry (especially 
‘utilities’) and pensions.  This in turn would lead to a growth in importance of pension, 
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insurance and mutual funds as institutional investors in place of strategic investors with close 
links to the large universal banks. Concerns about conflicts of interest in investment banking, 
especially in the US and the UK, have however challenged the viability of the universal 
banking model.  Particular issues include the independence of research reporting to investors 
and the possibility that shares have been placed cheaply with favoured clients who might well 
feel disposed to buy other services from the bank in the future.  There is also the issue of 
commercial banks using cheap loans and credit lines as loss leaders to clients who may be 
induced to buy more complex investment banking services from the vendor as a result.  It is 
unclear as yet whether judicious use of ‘Chinese walls’ and separately capitalized subsidiaries 
(‘firewalls’) will suffice, or whether the potential conflicts should be eliminated by more root 
and branch reform. Experiences in the USA indicate that conflicts of interest are merely the 
mirror image of synergies in conglomerate financial institutions.  
 
To perform its corporate governance function effectively, the financial sector itself must be 
efficient.  Given the numerous fiduciary duties involved and that the very existence of the 
sector is based on information asymmetries and economies of scale, it is naturally one of the 
more heavily regulated.  Hence ultimately, the establishment of an efficient corporate 
governance system requires the establishment of a competitive and efficient financial sector 
subject to regulation and supervision to protect the economy and wider society from systemic 
failures. The objectives of competition in the financial sector, which contributes to reducing 
the scope for conflicts of interest, may be inconsistent with regulation and supervision to 
achieve “stability” reducing systemic risk. The implementation of the Basel II capital adequacy 
framework is likely to increase concentration in banking and the financial sector as a whole. If 
competition thereby is reduced an important market check on conflicts of interest is weakened.  
 
Naturally, when the efficiency and stability of the financial system is called into question, as in 
post bubble Japan, and post bubble (and Enron and WorldCom) US, (and as in the possibly 
soon to be post housing bubble UK) and in light of the Asian, Russian, Brazilian, Turkish and 
Argentinean inter alia banking and wider financial and economic crises, the effectiveness of 
the regulatory and supervising system is called into question.  This in turn leads to periodic 
overhauls.  New rules in turn encourage circumventary innovation and periods of stability 
encourage laxity, or worse ‘capture’.  As the global financial system develops, the appropriate 
regulatory and supervising system for the financial sector itself evolves in an uncertain 
environment. 
 
The extent to which the market can be relied upon to condition corporate behaviour is now, of 
course, hotly debated post Enron.  More disclosure, as suggested in both corporate governance 
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codes for corporations and Basel II for banks, is only useful if the information disclosed is 
accurate and reliable. Accounting and auditing standards1, as well as other disclosure rules in 
general affect both accuracy and reliability, but if information disclosure requirements are not 
also conforming with firms’ and banks’ incentives to disclose information the efficacy of rules 
and requirements can be questioned.  We want to elaborate on this point. 
 
Under asymmetric information when there are opportunities to exploit information advantages 
there are still incentives for some “high quality” market participants to reduce the information 
gap through disclosure and signalling mechanisms. For example, the management that does 
not extract private benefits wants the market to know this. Similarly, the financial institution 
that benefits from synergies between corporate advisory services and financial research or 
brokerage without exploiting information for its own or particular clients’ benefits would want 
clients to know this. The bank that is particularly prudent in its risk taking and contractual 
enforcement would like investors to know. On the other hand, there are always a number of 
firms and financial institutions exploiting information advantages. Their management teams 
naturally want to avoid information about their behaviour being revealed. In a competitive 
environment the “high quality” firms have an incentive to help reveal the true nature of those 
hiding information. Thus, disclosure rules are most important in non-competitive 
environments. If disclosure rules are inconsistent with the information disclosure incentives of 
the “high quality” firms and banks as well, all market participants have the incentive to limit 
information disclosure to a minimum or they have the incentives to disclose in a less than 
truthful manner. In general, there are ways to disclose in such a way that information remains 
opaque.  
 
The implications of this discussion is that for information disclosure requirements to be 
effective they should be “market conform” in the sense that requirements are consistent with 
the incentives to disclose by high quality firms. Furthermore, encouragement of a competitive 
environment is likely to be at least as important for information revelation as disclosure 
requirements. 
 
One way in which the financial sector plays a key role in assuring good corporate governance 
is by creating competition among firms for the funds available in the capital markets. Through 
competition an efficient allocation of capital on a continuous, dynamic, basis should be 
achieved.  This involves continuous portfolio adjustment and re-allocation of capital.  
                                 
1 There seems to be a new impetus to the development of such standards under the auspices of 
the International Accounting Standards Boards,  post Enron. 
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An interesting question is how the CE and the UK corporate governance systems differ in their 
incentives to disclose information of various kinds. On the face of it, the firms in a system 
relying more on a competitive process for external funding of projects would be more inclined 
to disclose information, if the institutions supplying funds are also competing both for clients 
and for the wealth of households. The CE system has traditionally relied more on private 
information channels between firms and financial institutions, but if there are competing 
institutions then again there is one level requiring public information disclosure. The weakness 
of the CE system is most pronounced if the conglomerate financial institutions are able to limit 
competition among themselves and with alternative sources of external finance. The weakness 
of the UK system is most pronounced if the private information of managers is not made 
available to outside investors or their agents, i.e. institutional investors.  
 
The “globalization” of financial markets can be viewed as efficiency enhancing to the extent 
competition among financial institutions and among firms is increasing. However, 
‘globalisation’ also has its critics and as a result of the successful campaigning of anti-poverty 
and environmentalist activists new dimensions are being added to corporate governance and 
the responsibilities of institutional investor.  In the UK and the US in the 1990s, ethical or 
socially responsibility investment funds attracted investors willing to forgo some financial 
return if compensated by more environmentally or socially responsible investment (SRI).  In 
many cases the financial performance of such funds was not much different from mainstream 
funds, at least during the prolonged stock market upswing.  This in turn has encouraged 
companies to pay more attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental 
issues, leading to indices being developed to rank companies according to their performance in 
these non-financial spheres, and in some cases to ‘triple-bottom line’ auditing of financial, 
social and environmental performance.  Indeed UK pension law enacted in 201/2 required 
pension funds to state their SRI policy, even if they merely state that they do not have one 
(which is increasingly regarded as likely to be bad public relations).  The UK government is 
reportedly considering requiring all institutional investors to state their investment policies and 
explain their voting behaviour (or lack of it) at corporate shareholder meetings.  
 
Much of the debate about financial systems and corporate governance is focused on 
shareholder rights and shareholder influence on corporate behavior. However, much control 
over management behavior is exerted through bank and other forms of debt. The incentives of 
debt-holders to influence corporate behavior depend to a large extent on their rights in case of 
distress.  Therefore, bankruptcy laws are a key component of any corporate governance 
system.  The banks will only lend if they can get their money back, and bondholders take a 
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similar view.  In this sphere too there is plenty of room for debate and interesting contrasts.  
The recent UK Enterprise Bill aims to encourage entrepreneurship by improving the rights of  
‘good’ as apposed to ‘recalcitrant’ business debtors, relative to creditors; as a means of 
encouraging entrepreneurship and reducing the fear and stigma attached to business failure in 
the UK. One may ask whether stronger debtor rights in bankruptcy serves these objectives. 
The strongly creditor- and contract oriented UK bankruptcy law is known to encourage 
informal restructurings, while the more debtor-friendly, statutory US law discourages informal 
restructurings based on prior contractual arrangements.2 (Franks and Sussman, 2000) 
 
In the US there are proposals to tighten bankruptcy laws in favour of creditors.  It is clearly not 
easy to strike the correct balance between creditor and debtor orientation.  Too lax a law is 
likely to increase bank credit rationing to small businesses, especially start ups, and increase 
risk premia changed.  To tight a law is likely to discourage risk taking.  However, 
predictability of outcome would seem to be enhanced by a contractual approach as  in the 
current UK system, as long as the banking system is competitive. Thereby, the risk of abuse of 
power by banks is reduced.  
 
7. US and EU reform proposals 
In the US, the Enron debacle has inter alia triggered a number of legislative initiatives (such as 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of July 2002). In the EU a report by “the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts” on corporate governance reform was issued in November 2002. One 
motivation for the report is to “co-ordinate and strengthen efforts undertaken by and within 
Member States to improve corporate governance”. The immediate objectives are improving 
shareholder protection and restoring confidence in the system, which was shaken by the recent 
events. In the longer term the objective is to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of EU 
firms, aiding in the development of the Single Market and facilitating and empowering 
growing cross border investment. 
 
The High Level Group’s recommendations are clearly inspired by the developments in the UK.  
However, it recognizes that there is great diversity in company law and other areas affecting 
corporate governance within the EU and the diversity will increase further with enlargement in 
the next few years. It is therefore of great importance for the EU to develop procedures for 
corporate governance reform recognising this diversity among states. 
  
                                 
2  See Franks and Sussman (2000) and Wihlborg and Gangopadhyay (2001) 
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One group of proposals refer to disclosure of information related to corporate governance. The 
High Level Group proposes EU wide disclosure requirements for listed companies (although 
detailed rules would be set in Member States) referring to information about key elements of 
corporate governance rules in an annual statement, remuneration of directors, the costs of 
compensation schemes, the independence of directors and their qualifications, and group 
structures. 
 
A second group of proposals refer to the adoption of an EU recommendation strengthening the 
role of independent directors in audit, nomination, and remuneration committees as well as on 
the Board. Criteria are laid down for the independence of directors. There is a risk that the 
High level Group’s proposals for stringent rules for board members qualifications and 
responsibilities may discourage qualified individuals from board membership in some EU 
countries, and such rules could cause difficulties in countries where creditor and labour 
representatives are normally members of the board. 
 
The third group of proposals refer to EU support for national rules with respect to 
responsibilities of institutional investors to disclose investment policy and the exercise of 
voting rights, with voting strategies published and individual votes disclosed to beneficiaries of 
the institutional investor on request. These proposals are based on an assumption that self-
regulation of institutional investors has proven insufficient in the light of their passivity in the 
face of management failure and lack of information to beneficiaries. The European Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee (2002) have gone further and recommended that institutions 
be obliged to publish ex post a list of their votes in company meetings for their beneficiaries to 
examine. The Committee argues that this would shame those passively voting for 
management, and allow investigation of conflicts of interest. On the other hand, there is a 
danger that funds become obliged to take positions in areas where they do not have expertise. 
Going too far in the direction of requiring institutional investors to act beyond their capabilities 
would violate the principle of market conform regulation discussed above. 
 
       Finally, the High Level group suggests EU wide rules for responsibility of board members for 
financial statements. This issue is a case where self regulation alone has proven insufficient but 
one may question whether an EU Directive is needed since collective responsibility is already 
enshrined in national legislation.  
 
Mallin (2004) details recent developments in corporate governance in the US and the EU 
including the New York Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Rules (2003) and the EU’s 
‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU’ published in 
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November 2003 which largely incorporates the recommendations of the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts discussed earlier. In addition the OECD has recently issued revised 
principles of corporate governance in the Spring of 2004. 
 
The Swedish Commission on Business Confidence issued a report in May 2004 emphasising 
improved corporate governance, increased confidence in the financial sector, and a more 
effective competition policy. Although in most respects inspired by the UK and EU principles 
discussed above, the Swedish Commission deviates or goes further in some areas. The 
Company act should require that decisions with respect to remuneration principles and 
incentive programmes are taken at shareholder meetings. Companies covered by a “Code of 
Corporate Governance” (CCC) can deviate from the code under the principle “comply or 
explain”. There are rules for increased involvement by institutional investors but the 
commonly used differentiated voting rights are left untouched.  
 
Most far reaching are the proposals with respect to accounting and auditing. It is proposed that 
these matters are put under a new “accounting supervisory authority” that will oversee 
accounting in unlisted companies, accounting in listed companies, and auditing in the same 
way the Financial Supervisory Authority oversees financial institutions. Standard setting 
would be handled by a panel obtaining its mandate from the new authority.   
There are two dangers with such an upgrading of requirements in accounting and auditing. 
First, there is a danger that firms that do not reveal important information while abiding by the 
supervisors requirements may avoid responsibility for consequences of insufficent information 
disclosure.  Second, a new bureaucracy subject to political influences is created. 
 
The Swedish proposals for increased competition refers primarily to product markets and not 
to the financial industry. Thus, they do not provide a counter-weight to the likely competition 
reducing consequences of Basel II. 
 
8.  Concluding Comments 
The adoption of internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards has helped ensure 
that the UK has a high level of transparency and disclosure in the corporate and financial 
sectors.  Building on the sound foundations of the Cadbury (1992) recommendations, 
corporate governance has evolved through a series of far reaching reports including the 
Greenbury, Hampel, Turnbull, Myners, Higgs and Smith reports.  The revised Combined Code 
issued in July 2003 has carried on this tradition of a robust framework for corporate 
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governance, whilst institutional investors have been active in setting their agenda for active 
share ownership in the companies in which they invest. 
 
The UK principles for corporate governance seem to be market conform in the sense that the 
stipulate behavior consistent with incentives of management of “high quality firms” which do 
not try to exploit information advantages. Whether the same principles are market conform in 
the Continental EU with its different ownership structures and stronger roles for strategic 
controlling owners and associate banks is not obvious.  
 
We have argued that competition in both product and financial markets is important for 
appropriate market incentives in corporate governance to develop. Without such incentives 
codes of conduct and even legislation are likely to be ineffective. In this light it is unfortunate 
that the proposed capital regulation for banks in Basel II is likely to reduce competition in the 
financial sector. The UK stock market financial system is likely to be less influenced than the 
bank dominated Continental systems.  Finally it is worth mentioning that it is clearly worth 
debating the issue of whether the US should follow Sweden, the UK, Japan and now Germany 
in establishing a single (non-central bank) regulatory agency (built around the SEC?) in this 
age of financial conglomerates.  That is unless the conglomerates themselves have become 
dinosaurs or globalisation makes country based financial regulation and supervision redundant 
(even in the US!)  
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